The European Financial Crisis and the Problem of the Euro: An Analysis of Europe’s Financial Crisis Management

This study analyzes the management of the financial crisis that gripped the Eurozone during its first three years. The author seeks to exemplify the emergence of a new form of intra-European relations starting at the birth of the single European currency to the changes taking place within the European Union over the last two decades. Furthermore, she tackles the root causes of the European financial crisis, and its management, within the framework of the challenges posed by a unified currency. A thorough examination of the policies taking place at the start of the European financial crisis demonstrates that for the first three years of the crisis these policies sought to “correct the path” of the Euro; however, rather than focus on resolving the financial-monetary problem, they blamed the crisis-ridden smaller countries in crisis, forcing them to bear the responsibility. These policies were formulated at a time when pressure of the financial market’s collapse was imminent . During the same period, a number of agreements between the larger states within the European Union took place, as well as many temporary mitigating measures for the banking sector, which was reeling under heavy debt burden. The author believes that postponing a comprehensive solution to the crisis led to a rise in public and private sector debt, and placed unnecessary burdens on the European Central Bank, and will eventually lead to a joint effort among European states to alleviate the pressure from the banking crisis. In the event that the Euro succeeds in stabilizing, , prompting further integration between the states is expected. In their efforts to save their currency, European states have set a number of conditions, minutiae, and mechanisms, all of which will have contradictory outcomes regarding an ultimate resolution within the Eurozone. The study is based on the assumption that the European integrationist dynamic was primarily nurtured by each country’s own interest to avoid the emergence of a single hegemonic state. The new emerging variable is the increased potency of trans-national economic forces wanting to apply neoliberal policies, though they may face challenges in achieving political consensus.

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This study analyzes the management of the financial crisis that gripped the Eurozone during its first three years. The author seeks to exemplify the emergence of a new form of intra-European relations starting at the birth of the single European currency to the changes taking place within the European Union over the last two decades. Furthermore, she tackles the root causes of the European financial crisis, and its management, within the framework of the challenges posed by a unified currency. A thorough examination of the policies taking place at the start of the European financial crisis demonstrates that for the first three years of the crisis these policies sought to “correct the path” of the Euro; however, rather than focus on resolving the financial-monetary problem, they blamed the crisis-ridden smaller countries in crisis, forcing them to bear the responsibility. These policies were formulated at a time when pressure of the financial market’s collapse was imminent . During the same period, a number of agreements between the larger states within the European Union took place, as well as many temporary mitigating measures for the banking sector, which was reeling under heavy debt burden. The author believes that postponing a comprehensive solution to the crisis led to a rise in public and private sector debt, and placed unnecessary burdens on the European Central Bank, and will eventually lead to a joint effort among European states to alleviate the pressure from the banking crisis. In the event that the Euro succeeds in stabilizing, , prompting further integration between the states is expected. In their efforts to save their currency, European states have set a number of conditions, minutiae, and mechanisms, all of which will have contradictory outcomes regarding an ultimate resolution within the Eurozone. The study is based on the assumption that the European integrationist dynamic was primarily nurtured by each country’s own interest to avoid the emergence of a single hegemonic state. The new emerging variable is the increased potency of trans-national economic forces wanting to apply neoliberal policies, though they may face challenges in achieving political consensus.

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