The Arab Uprisings of 2011, hailed for their civil rights discourse, have also been feared for their potential to aggravate latent sectarian social divisions. With the specter of post-Spring Islamist rule looming, Christians in Egypt have found themselves forced to choose between a quasi-secular autocracy and the prospect of a sectarian democracy. Motivated by the same socio-economic grievances that affected their Muslim compatriots, and disillusioned with Mubarak’s increasing negligence of Christian affairs, many Christians were quick to join the uprising despite the Church’s strict condemnations. The January 25 Revolution marked a significant shift in Church-State-Copt dynamics, whereby the state could no longer rely on the Church to foster regime support among its constituents. Many Copts questioned the status quo of unelected religious leaders serving as unofficial communal representatives to the state, choosing instead to ally with liberal Muslims, and participate in public life through secular platforms. However, given the recent context of frequent sectarian attacks and a rising culture of anti-Christian hostility exacerbated by Islamic governance, the Church continues to retain its symbolic leadership role, with its outspoken Pope Tawadros II framing minority rights in national, rather than communal, terms. Although many Copts still rely on the pope to negotiate on their behalf, the Church has had to adapt to changing external and internal pressures, finding a delicate balance between its traditional role as a communal spokesperson and allowing alternative political modalities to exist outside the context of the Church.